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Right to Counsel in Deportation Proceedings
IRVING A. APPLEMAN*
Does an indigent alien have a right to assigned counsel in deporta-
tion proceedings?' The likelihood seems remote because the statute
states that "the alien shall have the privilege of being represented
(at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to
practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose."'2 Nevertheless, re-
cent decisions have emphasized a persistent judicial concern in this
area. This article's purpose is to present an overview of the repre-
* Member, Board of Immigration Appeals, Washington, D.C.; former
Chief Trial Attorney, United States Immigration and Naturalization Service;
former Appellate Trial Attorney, Office of General Counsel, Immigration
and Naturalization Service; Member, Bar of Massachusetts and United
States Supreme Court; J.D., Boston University Law School, 1939.
1. This article concerns the expulsion of aliens, as distinguished from
exclusion. The views expressed are solely those of the author. For an ex-
cellent comprehensive review of the role of attorneys in immigration pro-
ceedings, including exclusion proceedings, see Gordon, Right to Counsel in
Immigration Proceedings, 45 Vim. L. REv. 875 (1961), and Wasserman,
Practical Aspects of Representing an Alien of a Deportation Hearing, 14 SAN
DiEGo L. REv. 111 (1976).
2. Sections 242(b) and 292, Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§8 1252(b) (2) & 1362 (1970) (emphasis added) [The Immigration and
Nationality Act is hereinafter cited as L & N. Act.]. The same privilege
is accorded by statute and regulation in exclusion proceedings (id. § 236
(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 & 1362; 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1976)), as in fact it is
in every proceeding in which "examination" is required. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5 (b)
(1976).
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sentation of aliens in deportation cases and specifically to inquire
whether there is either an irrefutable legal basis for a requirement
of assigned counsel or a felt need. Preliminarily, understanding
the nature of the deportation process is necessary.
DEPORTATION IS NOT A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
The power to forbid the entrance of aliens, to admit aliens only
under prescribed conditions, and to expel those who have not been
naturalized is inherent in national sovereignty. This power is
vested in the legislative department of the Government, not in the
judicial, and is executed by the executive authority. The judiciary
may intervene only as required by the Constitution. A deportation
proceeding is not a trial which could result in a sentence for a crime
or offense.
It is simply the ascertainment, by appropriate and lawful means,
of the fact whether the conditions exist upon which Congress has
enacted that an alien ... may remain within the country. The or-
der of deportation is not a punishment for crime.3
"The determination. . . is not a conviction of crime, nor is the de-
portation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the government to
harbor persons whom it does not want."4
In the words of Justice Brandeis, "alienage is a condition, not a
cause of deportation."5 Although an alien is not deportable merely
because he is an alien, his privilege of remaining in the United
States may be revoked, under appropriate procedures, for violating
terms of admission or prescribed conditions of residence.
6
Pursuant to the well-established principle that deportation is an
administrative civil proceeding, not a criminal action, courts have
3. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). The con-
cept that deportation is not punishment has been criticized by several com-
mentators. See LeTourner v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.) (1976); Recent
Development, Deportation of an Alien for a Marijuana Conviction Can
Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Lieggi v. United States Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, 13 SAN Dimo L. REV. 454, 456-58 (1976).
4. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (Holmes, J.).
5. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923).
6. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
held that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, 7
the reasonable-doubt burden of proof in criminal proceedings,8 the
presence of the alien or his counsel at the hearing, and the require-
ment of a MirandacO-type warning in connection with preliminary
statements to an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of-
ficer 1 are not constitutionally mandated in deportation proceed-
ings. Moreover, broadly based assertions of a right to counsel un-
der the sixth amendment have been consistently rejected under the
same principle.12
TBE DEPoRTATION HEAEING
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,13 (Act) states in
section 24214 the requirements for a valid deportation hearing.
Among these, apart from the alien's right to counsel at his own ex-
pense, are the following: He must receive timely notice of the
charges against him; he must have an opportunity to be heard be-
fore an inunigration judge who performs no prosecutorial functions
in the case, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence; the
decision may be based only on the evidence produced at the hearing;
and the decision must be based on evidence which is "reasonable,
substantial, and probative" in character. 15
The INS has long had independent quasi-judicial hearings. The
immigration judge is a statutory officer'" with well-defined du-
7. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
8. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (held standard of proof in
deportation hearings is "clear, unequivocal, and convincing").
9. Weinbrand v. Prentis, 4 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1925). See also I. & N.
Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970), authorizing the hearing to proceed
without the presence of the alien after he has been given a "reasonable op-
portunity to be present."
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 326 (1966).
11. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923); Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d 1245
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971). See also Lavoie v. INS, 418
F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1969); Diric v. INS, 400 F.2d
658 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969); Nason v. INS, 370
F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1967); Pang v. INS, 368 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 386 U.S. 1037 (1967); Ben Huie v. INS, 349 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1965).
12. Burquez v. INS, 513 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1975); Tupacyupanqui-Marin
v. INS, 447 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1971); Murgia-Melendrez v. INS, 407 F.2d
207 (9th Cir. 1969); Lavoie v. INS, 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 854 (1969).
13. 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
14. I. & N. Act § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970).
15. But cf. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
16. He is also titled "Special Inquiry Officer." I. & N. Act § 242, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (1970); 8 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1) (1976).
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ties and responsibilities. Because of the "sole and exclusive" hear-
ing procedures dictated by section 242(b) of the Act, he is not ap-
pointed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.17 Neverthe-
less, he has the complete independence of an Administrative Law
Judge, presides over a hearing which may be fully adversary at any
time the alien chooses, and, unlike many proceedings under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, results in determinations of fact, law,
and discretion which are final, absent an appeal to the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA) or to the courts. He thus has power
which exceeds that of many Administrative Law Judges. This pow-
er carries commensurate responsibilities of knowledge and judg-
ment. Should an appeal be made, a full-scale review is available by
the BIA, which is not connected with the INS, and which has the
power to make independent findings of fact and conclusions of
law.'8 The BIA is in turn accountable to a United States Circuit
Court,19 if its decision is adverse to the alien. Some court decisions
mention the possibility that the alien may have difficulty under-
standing deportation proceedings conducted in English. However,
in the experience of the writer, this possibility is vastly overrated.
Although most aliens do not demonstrate a precocious ability to
communicate in English, there is a long-established tradition of
using competent interpreters. Thus the earliest order of business
in any deportation hearing is to ascertain the need for an inter-
preter. The hearing begins only after the immigration judge de-
cides that a satisfactory ability to communicate has been shown.
The immigration judge then advises the alien of the nature of the
proceeding and of his rights, including the right to counsel at his
own expense. At this stage of the proceeding, the immigration
judge knows nothing about the case. He may have before him a
simple case of a Mexican entrant without inspection, only too
anxious to be transported back to his family in Mexico, preferably
at United States Government expense, or the judge may be pre-
sented with something far more complicated.
If after notice, the alien expresses a desire for counsel, he must be
given ample opportunity to have counsel of his choice present.
20 If
17. See Marce~lo v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 303 (1955).
18. See C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATioN LAw AND PRoCEDURE
1-49 (rev. ed. 1975).
19. I. & N. Act § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105 (1970).
20. Chlomos v. United States Dep't of Justice, 516 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1975).
given reasonable opportunity, counsel fails to appear, the hearing
may proceed. 21 The issue here, of course, is the reasonableness of
the request either for additional continuances 22 or for the hearing's
change of situs for the convenience of the alien or counsel.
23
In practice, if the alien is indigent, the immigration judge usually
makes an effort to put the alien in touch with a voluntary agency
or legal aid group, if one is available, or with the Association of Im-
migration and Nationality Lawyers, whose members occasionally
perform pro bono services.
A word must be said about the role the voluntary agencies play
in deportation proceedings. Because of the excessive demand for
their services, some legal aid groups must rely, at least partially, on
law students. With safeguards spelled out by regulation,24 the INS
permits this procedure. In addition, well-established and highly
reputable agencies are concerned with the welfare of aliens and
have regularly undertaken the representation of indigent aliens in
immigration proceedings. The representatives of some of these
agencies are not members of the bar. However, here too INS regu-
lations permit the appearance of a qualified and recognized advo-
cate. The quality of such representation varies, but as a general
rule the service is useful, particularly in advising aliens about the
need for representation, in pleading to the allegations, and in assist-
ing pursuit of the various avenues of relief. Unfortunately, these
agencies' services are usually available only in large cities, and even
there, because of demands on their limited personnel, their repre-
sentatives cannot always appear, even though a need might exist.
WAimr OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
It has been stated that the same factors should be considered in
determining whether an alien is competent to waive counsel as are
21. Bisaillon v. Hogan, 257 F.2d 435 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
872 (1958) (not indigent and represented on appeal); United States v. Heik-
kinen, 240 F.2d 94 (7th Cir.), rev'd on. other grounds, 355 U.S. 223 (1957)
(not indigent; counsel in New York and hearing conducted in Min-
necota, where alien resided); Denegeleski v. Tillinghast, 65 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.
1933) (alien confined; counsel failed to appear after a three-month con-
tinuance and no prejudice shown); Alves v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (given one adjournment to obtain counsel, no prejudice
shown).
22. Castenada-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States ex rel. Wiczynski v. Shaughnessy, 185 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1950).
23. United States v. Heikkinen, 240 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1957).
24. 8 C.F.R. § 291 (1976); see [Roberts], Recognition of Organizations
and Accreditation of Representatives Before the Immigration Service and
Board of Immigration Appeals, 53 INTERPRETER RELEASES 103 (1976).
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used in determining whether a confession or admission is competent
-namely, age, intelligence, education, information, understanding,
and ability to comprehend. 25 If the alien declares that he wishes
to waive counsel, the immigration judge has the initial responsibil-
ity of assuring that the waiver is conscious and intelligent within
the above criteria.26 Nevertheless, the imnnigration judge's respon-
sibility does not end there. He usually advises the alien that if he
changes his mind about having counsel during the hearing, he
should inform the judge. Furthermore, if during the hearing the
judge perceives the likelihood that the presence of counsel might af-
fect the outcome, he can and frequently does reexamine the alien
about the waiver of counsel. Failure to take these precautions
clearly invites a reversal.2
7
An intelligent, knowing, and completely voluntary waiver of
counsel has invariably been held to satisfy the requirement of a fair
hearing, particularly when it has not been demonstrated that the
presence of counsel would have affected the outcome of the proceed-
ings. In De Souza v. Barber,28 the alien was a nineteen-year-old
whose waiver was held "competent and intelligent." Minority per
se was also rejected in Murgia-Melendez v. INS,29 as a ground for
finding waiver of counsel involuntary. Similarly, the mere fact
that the alien was confined at the time of the hearing does not
invalidate his waiver.30
However, in United States ex rel. Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman
and in Kovac v. INS,31 neither of the aliens spoke English, and the
respective courts were not convinced the aliens understood the na-
25. Murgia-Melendrez v. INS, 407 F.2d 207, 209-10 (9th Cir. 1969); De
Souza v. Barber, 263 F.2d 470, 476-77 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989
(1959).
26. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel.
Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
27. See Barthold v. INS, 517 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1975) (an example of
the immigration judge taking careful pains to inform the alien of his
rights).
28. 263 F.2d 470, 476-77 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989 (1959).
29. 407 F.2d 207, 209-10 (9th Cir. 1969).
30. Giaimo v. Pederson, 289 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1961) (represented during
appeal); Madokoro v. Del Guercio, 160 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1947) (indigent;
facts admitted and no showing of prejudice); United States ex rel. Wio-
dinger v. Reimet, 103 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1939); United States ex rel. Cicerelli
v. Curran, 12 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1926).
31. See note 26 supra.
ture of the proceedings. A similar unfamiliarity with the language
and lack of "intelligent, reasonable opportunity to explain" his case
was persuasive in Van Den Berg v. Lehmann.8 2 However, in
Millan-Garcia v. INS,33 the court noted there was nothing to show
the alien was unable to afford a lawyer, that he made no request for
a continuance to employ counsel of his own choosing, and that he
"voluntarily and understandingly" waived counsel.
Also waiver has been held effective when intelligently made at
the first hearing; the alien need not again be advised of his right
to counsel after a two-month continuance.3 4 Absent a showing of
prejudice, the fact that an indigent alien elected to proceed without
counsel during a part of the proceedings did not warrant reversal
when he was represented at the hearing upon remand and during
two appeals to the BIA.35 In general it seems that even a belated
appearance of counsel can cure an earlier absence.8 6
PROCEDURAL DUE PRocEss REQUnmED
What then of those cases in which an alien does not waive counsel
but is indigent and cannot secure legal assistance on a voluntary ba-
sis? Clearly in some cases the deprivation of counsel, regardless of
how solicitous the immigration judge is to keep the alien informed,
may work to his disadvantage. Knowledgeable counsel often pro-
tects his client with a tenacity impossible for even the most high-
minded and objective public servant, and this protection is certainly
beyond the capacity of the alien himself.
While the Congress has plenary power to delineate, without judi-
cial review, the classes of aliens who may enter and the conditions
under which they may remain, the courts nevertheless retain the
power to scrutinize the procedures by which aliens are found to be
within a statute's proscriptions. Even aliens who have allegedly en-
tered the United States illegally are entitled to the full protection
of the constitutional requirements of procedural due process in de-
portation proceedings.37
32. 261 F.2d 828, 829 (6th Cir. 1958).
33. 343 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1965).
34. Diric v. INS, 400 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015
(1969).
35. Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1974).
36. Beck v. Neely, 202 F;2d 221 (7th Cir. 1953); Schenck v. Ward, 80 F.2d
422 (lst Cir. 1935).
37. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-
Grath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86
(1903); Miflan-Garcia v. INS, 343 F.2d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 1965).
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It is around this fifth amendment procedural due process require-
ment that the most serious argument for the right of appointed
counsel in deportation proceedings has been mounted. In essence,
the rationale is as follows: To an alien, deportation can be a matter
of grave consequence, sometimes amounting to loss of liberty, prop-
erty, or even life itself; included in his right to procedural due proc-
ess is the right to a fair hearing at which he shall be heard and have
a full opportunity to present his case; and because of the nature of
the hearing and the gravity of its consequences, the absence of
counsel necessarily impairs "fundamental fairness . . . the touch-
stone of due process."38
To date no court has reversed a lower court solely because of an
indigent alien's lack of appointed counsel. At the same time the
courts have not hesitated to judge the "fairness" of the hearing un-
der a test of possible prejudicial error occasioned by lack of counsel.
In the following analysis of the prejudicial-error test, the distinc-
tion is important between failure to allow the statutorily mandated
opportunity to secure counsel given a person who can afford to pay
for representation (or who might be able to secure free representa-
tion if offered the chance) and the absolute right to counsel guaran-
teed by the fifth amendment. Unfortunately, it is not always possi-
ble to tell from the decisions whether the court was concerned with
the statutory right or with the constitutional right. In many in-
stances the courts have applied the prejudicial-error test without
any particular concern, or at least without any expressed finding of
the indigent alien's inability to secure counsel. Nevertheless, while
it would be easy to rationalize the decisions as mostly dealing with
the statutory right, dismissing the frequent references to procedural
due process is not easy, for these references would be surplusage if
the only concern were the breach of a statutory right to secure
counsel, and not a violation of the fifth amendment.
APPLICATION OF THE PREJUDICE TEST
The prejudice test has been variously described.
38. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). In at least one case,
an unsuccessful argument has been made that because the statute permits
counsel at no expense to the Government, but does not require counsel for
indigent aliens, the statute denies indigent aliens who want counsel due
process and equal protection of the laws. Henriques v. INS, 465 F.2d 119
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973).
To render a hearing unfair, the defect, or the practice complained
of, must have been such as might have led to a denial of justice,
or there must have been absent one of the elements deemed essen-
tial to due process.
39
In the context of this discussion, the test resolves itself into two
questions: (1) Was counsel necessary for the alien to present his po-
sition adequately to the immigration judge? (2) Might the pres-
ence of counsel have made a difference in the outcome of the pro-
ceedings? 40
Thus courts have held that a hearing was unfair when an indigent
alien's waiver of counsel at the hearing was not knowing and intelli-
gent, when he was not informed of his right to appear in person or
by counsel before the BIA, and when if all the facts had been laid
before the hearing officer or the BIA, the outcome of the case would
have been different.41 In Barrese v. Ryan,42 the alien, a long-time
resident (not an indigent) was held to have been deprived of coun-
sel in violation of his statutory privilege when he effectively waived
counsel during the hearing before the hearing officer, but asserted
his desire for counsel before the BIA and because of circumstances
beyond his control, was unable to secure representation in time.
Similarly, a hearing has been held lacking in essential fairness
when an attorney entered his appearance in New Jersey, the alien
was subsequently apprehended in Miami, and a hearing was sched-
uled and conducted in Miami without notice to counsel and without
counsel's presence, despite the alien's request for his lawyer. The
circuit court held that the immigration judge's statement that he
would deny any motion to remove the case to New Jersey amounted
to a prejudgment preventing the development of possibly signifi-
cant circumstances. 43
In an interesting recent decision, the Seventh Circuit, while pre-
termitting the constitutional issue of an absolute right to counsel,
held that the right to counsel guaranteed by the statute was
breached by the immigration judge's refusal to grant a second con-
tinuance to allow the aliens, people of limited means, additional op-
39. United 'States ex rel. Bilokunsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923)
(Brandeis, J.).
40. See Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1975).
41. United States ex rel. Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22
(E.D. Pa. 1950). See also Van Den Berg v. Lehmann, 261 F.2d 828 (6th
Cir. 1958).
42. 189 F. Supp. 449 (D. Conn. 1960).
43. Chlomos v. United States Dep't of Justice, 516 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1975).
See also Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
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portunity to secure counsel. Because of the violation of the statu-
tory right, the court refused to apply a harmless-error test.
44
However, in Henriques v. INS,45 the court found no prejudice, for
the sole issue was whether the alien was a nonimmnigrant visitor for
pleasure who overstayed his four-day visa; it was undisputed that
he had done so, and no justification or excuse had been offered, even
during judicial review. Significantly, the court left open the
"grave" question of
whether, in a deportation hearing where the furnishing of counsel
might have an effect upon the outcome of the deportation hearing
itself, indigent aliens are entitled to have counsel furnished at gov-
ernment expense.46
Similarly, in Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS,47 the alien, an indigent
denied appointed counsel, had been found within the purview of
section 241(a) (11) of the Act 48 because of a narcotics conviction.
After the deportation hearing he moved to withdraw his guilty plea
to the narcotics violation and, through Legal Assistance counsel, ar-
gued before the BIA and the court the nonfinality of the conviction
underlying the deportation proceedings. The court noted that the
lack of counsel before the immigration judge did not prevent full
administrative consideration of his argument and that counsel could
not have obtained different results. Consequently "fundamental
fairness" was not abridged during the administrative proceedings
and no constitutional infirmity existed for lack of "due process."
Again, however, in a footnote dictum, the court rejected the cases
setting forth a per se rule against appointed counsel in deportation
proceedings, as based on an "outmoded" distinction between crimi-
nal and civil proceedings. Furthermore, the court stated flatly:
[W]here an unrepresented indigent alien would require counsel to
present his position adequately to an immigration judge, he must
be provided with a lawyer at the Government's expense. Other-
wise, "fundamental fairness" would be violated.49
Like the Second and Sixth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit appears to
44. Castenada-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1975).
45. 465 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1972).
46. Id. at 121; cf. Carbonell v. INS, 460 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
47. 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1) (1970).
49. 516 F.2d at 568-69 n.3.
have "reserved" the question of the right of appointed counsel for
an indigent alien.
Whether the indigent alien has a right to appointed counsel has
been much discussed in the federal courts, but never considered by
the Supreme Court. The existence, let alone the nature and scope,
of such a right has not been established. The parties would have
us address this problem here but we find that "the posture of the
case is such that we do not reach the issue petitioner seeks to
raise."50
Noting that the proceedings could be analyzed "in terms of their
fundamental fairness on a case-by-case basis," the court found that
the alien, an indigent who had conceded his illegal entry, was ad-
vised that he could seek free counsel but instead elected to proceed
without an attorney. "Had he sought such aid and been unsuccess-
ful, we would have to decide the question urged upon us." The ap-
peal was then dismissed. 51
Earlier, in Rosales-Caballero v. INS,52 the same court termed the
issue a "momentous" one and remanded for testimony of the alien's
indigency, pointedly suggesting that the issue would be mooted by
a de novo hearing on the merits, at which the alien could be repre-
sented without fee by an attorney from the same Legal Service
group which represented him before the court.
In De Bernardo v. Rogers,-3 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia also indicated its unwillingness to reject the argument
outright, stating:
It is unnecessary to decide whether due process requires that coun-
sel be appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a deportation
proceeding because the facts on which deportation was ordered in
this case were not in issue.54
In summary, at least four circuits, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and
the District of Columbia, have recognized in varying degrees the vi-
ability of the constitutional issue of the indigent alien's absolute
right to counsel under the fifth amendment. Two circuits, the
Ninth and Tenth, appear to believe that under outstanding case law
no such right exists.
NEED FOR AppoNTE CouNsEL
The recently arrived Mexican or Canadian who crossed the bor-
50. Barthold v. INS, 517 F.2d 689, 690 (5th Cir. 1975).
51. Id. at 691.
52. 472 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1973).
53. 254 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
54. Id. at 82.
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der illegally has little need for appointed counsel if given the op-
tion of voluntary departure without the stigma of a deportation
order, the only relief available in this situation under the law. In
the great majority of deportation cases, the experience of the writer
suggests that the presence or absence of appointed counsel cannot
make the slightest difference in the outcome. In the usual case,
the alien either is a nonimmigrant who entered illegally, is in clear
violation of status, or has remained longer than authorized. 55 His
stay has been brief, and he has no family ties here. Deportability
is clear, and, more often than not, freely conceded. Voluntary de-
parture is liberally granted, often with generous time periods
within which to leave. The significance of voluntary departure is
that it facilitates the alien's ability to subsequently immigrate. 56
The only thing that could be achieved by the presence of counsel
in such a case would be delaying the inevitable, and in many cases
the result would be even greater anguish to the alien because of the
destruction of unwarranted hope and the eventual severance of
increasing ties with this country. The author hopes that statements
about the unnecessary presence of counsel in the preceding discus-
sion will not be taken out of context.
What then of the remaining cases in which counsel could make a
difference? Thousands of deportation hearings are held each year,
and 7 well over half of the appeals to the BIA are deportation
cases. To say that counsel would make no difference in most cases
is not to say that the remaining cases are either insubstantial in
number or inconsequential in import. How does one draw the line
between saying due process requires the presence of appointed
counsel in every deportation hearing and ensuring counsel when-
ever necessary or desirable to a fair hearing?
An undetermined, but large number of deportation cases involve
indigents. Some commentators have concluded that because of the
possible severity of the "penalty," a due process right to assigned
counsel exists for the indigent alien and that the right should be
55. See 1975 INS, ANNuALr REPoRT 96.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (16) (1970). For discussion of voluntary depar-
ture, see Wasserman, Practical Aspects of Representing an Alien at a Depor-
tation Hearings, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. Ill (1976); Comment, Suspension of
Deportation: Illusory Relief, id. at 229, 252-55.
57. According to INS records, 40,697 deportation hearings were completed
in fiscal 1975.
recognized in at least selected categories of cases. 8 The thesis,
however, runs into a fundamental difficulty. If the alien has a
right to assigned counsel in one kind of deportation case, surely
he has it in all deportation cases, for every deportation case carries
the same ultimate possibility of forcible ejection from the United
States. Any general basis of selectivity which would reject that
right insome deportation cases must, almost by definition, be im-
proper. As a practical matter one is led to the conclusion that, ab-
sent a waiver, counsel would have to be present in every deporta-
tion case. In the opinion of the writer, a sounder and more realistic
approach, and one which, as we have seen, the courts have widely
recognized and applied, is the prejudicial-error test on a case-by-
case basis. Deprivation of counsel should be grounds for reversal
only if such deprivation was prejudicial.
Of course the case-by-case, prejudice, or special-circumstances
test has been called into question in criminal proceedings by the Su-
preme Court's rulings in Gideon v. Wainright 9 and Argersinger v.
Hamlin.60 Similarly the Court's holdings in Morrissey v. Brewer,0 1
and In re GauZt 6 2 have undermined the position that counsel need
be provided to indigents only in criminal proceedings. 8 Neverthe-
less, it is a long step, as indicated in Henriques v. INS,64 from these
cases to "a blanket rule that the Fifth Amendment requires, as a
matter of due process, counsel for indigent aliens in all deportation
cases, regardless of their nature."65
In this connection, it should be noted that in Murgia-Melendez v.
INS,(6 the petitioner did contend that because of the potential con-
sequences, deportation proceedings were of a criminal nature as
were those faced by the juvenile in In re Gault, and that, because
a stringent standard of due process must be observed, effective rep-
resentation could be obtained only through counsel. Petitioner re-
lied upon Escobedo v. Illinois67 and Massiah v. United States 8 for
58. Comment, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARv. INT'L L.J.
177 (1970); Comment, Due Process and Deportation-Is There a Right to
Assigned Counsel, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 289 (1975).
59. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
60. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
61. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
62. 387 U.S. 527 (1969).
63. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Comment, Deportation and the Right to Coun-
sel, supra note 58.
64. 465 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1972).
65. Id. at 121, n.4.
66. 407 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1969).
67. 378 U.S. 478 (1964); note 4 supra.
68. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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support of this position. The argument was rejected because of
"compelling case law . .. that a deportation proceeding is not a
criminal prosecution."0 9 The contention that the majority view in
Argersinger negated a case-by-case approach to deportation cases
was also rejected by the Second Circuit in Henriques v. INS.70
In rejecting the case-by-case or special-circumstances rule in Ar-
gersinger v. Hamlin, the Court appears to have been convinced
that the possibility of imprisonment, even for a petty offense, brings
into play the due process protection of right to counsel. As Justice
Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion (in a different con-
text), a "mechanistic application" of this "prophylactic rule" clearly
and easily resolves any due process issue.
7 1
By definition, of course, any deprivation of liberty is within the
fifth amendment. But not every possibility of deportation amounts
to a deprivation of liberty without due process. The result in only
the occasional deportation case approximates the consequences of
criminal sanction contemplated by the fifth amendment. The
"mechanistic application," which the Court believed was required in
Argersinger, is not needed to assure a due process "fair hearing" in
all deportation cases. As to those occasional cases in which it is
needed, the case-by-case, special-circumstances, or prejudice rule
provides a more than adequate procedural due process safeguard for
the indigent alien, particularly since we are not without some guide-
lines in identifying potential danger spots.
Concern over the fairness of the hearing reasonably should be in
direct proportion to what is at stake. Certain types of deportation
cases indicate by their very nature an inherent possibility of preju-
dice to substantial rights which may demonstrate a particular need
for counsel. These categories are readily recognizable.7 2 They con-
69. Murgia-Melendrez v. INS, 407 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1969), citing
Nason v. INS, 370 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1967); Ah Chiu Pang v. INS, 368
F.2d 637, 639 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1037 (1966). See also United
States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1975); Martin-Mendoza v. INS,
499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1974); Dunn-Marin v. District Director, 426 F.2d 894
(9th Cir. 1970). (These later decisions of the Ninth Circuit appear to have
resolved the earlier hesitation expressed in In re Raimondi, 126 F. Supp.
390 (N.D. Cal. 1954)).
70. 465 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1972).
71. 407 U.S. 25, 49, 50 (1972) (concurring opinion).
72. With some variations, they have been noted by other writers in this
cern basically: (1) the claimant to United States citizenship; (2)
the claimant to lawful permanent residence; and (3) the claimant to
adjustment to permanent residence.
Claim to United States Citizenship
In the first place, alienage is jurisdictional to a deportation hear-
ing.73 United States citizenship is treasured. The absence of coun-
sel in a deportation hearing where a substantial claim to United
States citizenship is advanced (assuming the alien was knowledge-
able enough to advance this claim) could easily invite a successful
challenge on prejudicial grounds.
74
By way of example, representation could be particularly signifi-
cant in any case in which a claim to derivative citizenship is made
through a citizen parent or in which alienage is predicated on loss
of citizenship through expatriation.
Claim to Lawful Permanent Residence
Again, lawful permanent residence as an immigrant is a valuable
privilege. Scholars in the field have argued the irrationality of leg-
islation which makes the lawful immigrant deportable for reasons
not directly connected with his fitness as an immigrant at the time
he entered. 75 Nevertheless, the statute makes the immigrant alien
deportable for some grounds which can arise years after he has sev-
ered the ties with his homeland and has established his life in the
United States. The courts have uniformly sustained the constitu-
tionality of such provisions.
76
field. See Comment, Due Process and Deportation-Is There a Right to As-
signed Counsel, supra note 58.
73. United States ex rel. Biokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
74. An alleviating factor here is the possibility of de novo trial of a citi-
zenship issue under section 360 of the I. & N. Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970).
Derivative citizenship is discussed in Comment, How to Immigrate to the
United States: A Practical Guide for the Attorney, 14 Sn DIEGO L. Ru.
193, 195-96 (1976).
75. See, e.g., Wasserman, Grounds and Procedures Relating to Deporta-
tion, 13 SAN DmGo L. REV. 125, 127-28 (1975).
76. E.g., section 241 (a) (4) of the I. & N. Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970)
(convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude at any
time after entry); id. § 241 (a) (5) (failure to register as an alien); id. §
241 (a) (6) (joining a subversive group at any time after entry); id. § 241
(a) (11) (convicted of a narcotic offense, including possession of mari-
juana); id. § 241(a) (14) (carrying a sawed-off shotgun); id. § 241 (a) (17)
(convicted of a violation of any of several enumerated statutes). "The
validity of distinctions drawn by Congress with respect to deportability is
not a proper subject for judicial concern." Oliver v. United States Dep't
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Despite reservations about the sometimes loose application of the
oft-quoted language that deportation may "result also in loss of
both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living,"''77 in
the case of a recently arrived "jumped-ship" crewman, "remained-
longer" visitor for pleasure, or an alien without ties here who en-
tered surreptitiously or in transit to another country, little question
can exist of the language's applicability to the lawfully admitted
permanent resident who may become deportable after living prac-
tically his entire life in the United States.
The Supreme Court has recognized the special status of the lawful
permanent resident vis-h-vis other aliens.
[T]he Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking ad-
mission for the first time to these shores. But once an alien law-
fully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders. Such rights include those protected by the First and the
Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. None of these provisions acknowledges any distinc-
tion between citizens and resident aliens. They extend their inali-
enable privileges to all "persons" and guard against any encroach-
ment on those rights by federal or state authority.T8 ] To be sure,
a lawful resident alien may not captiously be deprived of his con-
stitutional rights to procedural due process.
79
The permanent resident alien probably has satisfied the statute's
quantitative and qualitative requirements. He has successfully un-
dergone the scrutiny of a United States consul or (in the case of ad-
justment of status8 0 in the United States) of an immigration officer,
or of both. His status may even have been specially conferred by
Congress.8 1 He has a prima facie right to lifelong presence here.
He may work, and he may proceed toward citizenship. These are
valuable priVileges, and their deprivation without the most careful
of Justice, 517 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1975); see Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,
530-32 (1954).
77. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
78. Kwong Hal Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 161 (concurring opinion) (1945).
79. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezel, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953).
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970), as amended Inunigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 6 (Oct. 20, 1976). For a discus-
sion of the 1976 Amendment, see Afterword: The Immigration and Na-
tionality Act Amendments of 1976, 14 SAN DIEGo L. Rv. 326 (1976). See
Wasserman, supra note 75, at 136-37.
81. See Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1952).
regard for constitutional safeguards, including counsel, should rea-
sonably lead to a possible application of the test of prejudice for
lack of counsel.
Claim to Adjustment to Permanent Resident
The final category is stated with reservations, for, without some
restrictive definition of its application to bona fide and substantial
claimants, it could be subject to abuse. Some aliens have entered
surreptitiously or as nonimmigrants and originally had no claim to
permanent residence, but through either the passage of time or
the accrual of family ties and other equities are in a position to
legitimately seek permanent residence under the statutes' various
relief provisions. Thus, for example, an alien who has resided here
either seven or ten years after committing a deportable act (depend-
ing on the ground for deportation) may seek suspension of deporta-
tion.8 2 Also many aliens, regardless of length of residence, may
qualify for adjustment of status to permanent resident if eligible for
an immigrant visa and if a visa is immediately available. 83 Other
long-term residents who entered before June 30, 1948, may seek cre-
ation of a record of lawful admission.8 4
These aliens might conceivably be denied an adjustment of status,
either as a matter of eligibility or in the exercise of discretion, even
though vigorous representation might have tipped the scales the
other way. Even more importantly, an unwitting failure may occur
(1) to press for some lesser relief that may be available, (2) to op-
pose one ground of deportability because of admitted deportability
on another, or (3) to challenge one of several bases on which relief
is denied because of the clear applicability of the other grounds. An
adverse ruling in any of these circumstances might easily bar the
alien from ever obtaining lawful permanent residence, or, at the
least, make clearing substantial hurdles necessary by way of waiv-
82. Not available to a crewman who entered after June 30, 1964, or "ex-
change" student (section 101 (a) (15) (j) of the I. & N. Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(1970)), or with certain exceptions to a native of a contiguous country
(id. § 101(b) (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (b) (5)). For a thorough discussion of
suspension of deportation, see Comment, Suspension of Deportation: Il-
lusory Relief, 14 SAlr D co L. REV. 229 (1976).
83. See Wasserman, Representing an Alien at a Deportation Hearing,
14 SAwr DI=_o L. REv. 111 (1976); Comment, How to Immigrate to the
United States: A Practical Guide for the Attorney, id. at 193, 220-23.
84. I. & N. Act § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1970). See Wasserman, Practical
Aspects of Representing an Alien at a Deportation Hearing, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 111 (1976); Comment, How to Immigrate to the United States: A
Practical Guide for the Practicing Attorney, id. at 193, 225-26.
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ers, which the alien would otherwise not confront should he seek to
return at a future date.
Two examples will suffice. The most obvious situation is the
passive acceptance of a deportation order, should adjustment be de-
nied, without the alien pressing for the privilege of voluntary de-
parture to eliminate the stigma of deportation. Deportation makes
necessary a subsequent grant of permission to reapply for admis-
sion, a discretionary application passed upon by the INS; voluntary
departure obviates the application. The second example is empha-
sized by the recent Lennon v. INS case.8 5 Although Lennon was
clearly deportable as a visitor who had remained longer than au-
thorized, he sought adjustment on the basis of his family ties here.
The relief was mandatorily denied by the INS because of a narcotic
conviction in Britain. Counsel attacked the conviction as one not
requiring a knowing possession of the narcotic and hence not within
the statute's prohibition. The court of appeals agreed with counsel
and remanded the case for discretionary consideration of the appli-
cation. Had sophisticated counsel not prevailed in his argument,
Lennon not only would have had a denial of adjustment to per-
manent resident because of statutory ineligibility, but he also would
have faced permanent debarment from the United States because
of the conviction. 6
Therefore, a reasonable anticipation is that the alien who is in a
position to qualify for suspension of deportation or adjustment of
status to permanent resident is also in a favorable position to argue
that he should be entitled to counsel under the prejudice test.
A caveat is in order. These categories are not exclusive. It is
possible to have a failure of procedural due process from lack of
counsel in a deportation case outside these categories. It is equally
possible that a fair hearing could be held within these three categor-
ies despite the absence of counsel and that representation could
85. Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975). For a full discription
of the Lennon litigation, see Wildes, The Non-Priority Program of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the
Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 n.4 (1976).
86. Cf. Rose v. Woolwine, 344 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1965). See also, Wildes,
United States Immigration Service v. John Lennon: Cultural Lag, 40
BROOKLYN L. REv. 270 (1973); Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service-A Measure of the Attorney General's
Concern for Aliens, 53 L ERPnETE R RELEASES 25 (1976).
make absolutely no difference in the outcome. A claim to citizen-
ship, for example, can be advanced when, under the applicable law,
assuming the absolute truth of all that is claimed, the claimant
could not possibly be a citizen. The lawful permanent resident fre-
quently has no alternative under the law but to concede deportabil-
ity and the unavailability of any relief. Similarly, the alien seeking
adjustment to permanent residence may face absolute statutory
bars. And in any of the categories, the claim to the favored status
may be so frivolous and unfounded as to be purely dilatory, war-
ranting peremptory rejection.
However, the categories should be regarded as containing clear
warning signals to the INS trial attorney, the immigration judge,
the BIA, and the courts. A claim within one of these categories that
has any substance whatsoever should be scrutinized for the slightest
implication of prejudicd to the unrepresented respondent caused by
absence of counsel. Only if: (1) all possible rights and avenues of
relief have been fully explained and explored; (2) every opportu-
nity (and possibly even assistance) has been given in developing a
proper record; and (3) the presence of counsel could not have made
the slightest difference in the outcome of the case, or there has
been an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver of counsel,
should an adverse ruling be reasonably certain of withstanding a
fair-hearing, procedural-due-process challenge for lack of counsel.
As far as the administrative authorities are concerned, the lan-
guage of the statute speaks the clear intent of the Congress. There
is neither a license for appointed counsel at Government expense,
nor, so far as known, any source from which the necessary funds
could be appropriated without violation of the congressional pro-
scription. At the same time, the very anticipation of close scrutiny,
in itself, and quite apart from the burden put upon the Government
in safeguarding the record, should be enough to indicate the desira-
bility of a maximum effort in exercising a prudent administrative
policy to secure representation, not compensated by the Govern-
ment, for the indigent alien, in at least these three types of cases.
CONCLUSION
Expulsion of aliens is basically an implied political power, inher-
ent in national sovereignty, plenary in nature, and not subject to ju-
dicial control except as to the manner in which it is exercised.8 7 The
87. See C. GoRDoN & H. RosENFInD, ImMiGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 1-
29 (rev. ed. 1975) and cases cited for a fuller discussion of the distinction
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power is exercised administratively through an executive official-
the Attorney General. An administrative hearing procedure has
been established by statute which carefully and fairly delineates the
rights and privileges of the alien.
Like many administrative hearings, the consequences of an ad-
verse ruling can have a grave effect on property and person. How-
ever, these are not criminal proceedings. Absent a clear demonstra-
tion of inadequacy in the administrative process, no reasons exists
for disturbing a rule enunciated as far back as 1893 and followed
since then. As the Supreme Court noted in Galvan v. Press,88 in
rejecting the applicability of the ex post facto clause to deportation,
"the slate is not clean .... [This] is not merely 'a page of history'
... but a whole volume."""
Without impairing the objective of achieving justice, the law must
work within the confines of practicality and reality. Over seventy
years ago, the Supreme Court noted that the alien's right to an op-
portunity to be heard means
not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular, set occasion, and ac-
cording to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that will secure
the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the
same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon which such
officers are required to act.9 0
True, "inconvenience and added expense to the Immigration Serv-
ice" is not a determinative factor if the price is essential fairness.9 1
Nevertheless, appointed counsel in each of the many deportation
cases involving indigents heard each year, would not necessarily
help achieve justice. On the contrary, substantial and completely
unwarranted adjournments and delays in the completion of the ad-
ministrative process could easily result in the detriment to both an
already overburdened Government agency and the alien.
Procedural due process and a "fair hearing" are requisites. Ex-
perience has shown that with respect to the lack of counsel, the
between substantive and procedural due process with respect to deportation
proceedings.
88. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
89. Id. at 531.
90. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903).
91. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 46 (1950).
prejudice test, applied on a case-by-case basis, is a completely ade-
quate safeguard to procedural due process and one that is liberally
used. In certain types of deportation cases, the need for counsel
may be more acute and the absence of counsel more likely to affect
the result. In these cases the courts have been more amenable to
finding that the absence of counsel prejudiced a fair hearing.
As Justice Stewart said in Costello v. INS, "[i] n this area of the
law, involving as it may the equivalent of banishment or exile, we
do well to eschew technicalities and fictions and to deal instead with
realities. ' 92 Earlier, Judge Learned Hand expressed the same
thought; "these are consequences whose warrant we may properly
scrutinize with some jealousy, and insist that logic shall not take the
place of understanding. '93 It is apparent that, consciously or not,
this underlying approach to deportation cases has motivated judicial
review of claims of prejudice arising from lack of appointed counsel
and that the approach dictates an equal concern on the part of ad-
ministrative authorities when the absence of counsel might impair
substantial rights.
92. 376 U.S. 120, 131 (1964).
93. United States ex rel. Mignozzi v. Day, 51 F.2d 1019, 1021 (2d Cir.
1931).
